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lN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
H. WILLIAM NALDER, CATHERINE
NALDER and H. WILLIAM NALDER,

JR.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No. 8313
vs.
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs in this action (respondents herein)
filed suit against defendant (appellant herein) alleging
that they had been damaged in their business as turkey
raisers in the years 1952, 1953 and 1954 because of defendant's failure to release real estate and chattel mortgages executed by the plaintiffs and delivered to defendant in connection with certain financing agreements between the parties in the years 1949, 1950 and 1951. The
plaintiffs' contention is to the effect that the existence of
the mortgages upon the records in Davis County, Utah,
prevented them from securing turkey financing from
other companies, interfered with their credit and pre-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

vented them from raising the number of turkeys during
the years of 1952, 1953 and 1954, they claim they intended to and were capable of raising, which, had plaintiffs been able to secure the necessary financing, would
have resulted in profits of $129,700.80. (R. 1-2)
The defendant denied the material allegations of the
wrong alleged and of the damages claimed and counterclaimed to foreclose a real estate mortgage from the plaintiffs, H. William N alder, Sr. and Catherine N alder, his
wife. (R. 4-11 )
Issues were framed and the case proceeded to trial
before the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment, findings of fact and conclusions of law by which
plaintiffs were awarded the sum of $90,950.10 after deducting the sum of $6,584.10 which the court found was
owing by plaintiffs to defendant upon the note and mortgage alleged in defendant's counterclaim. (R. 22-25)
Within the required time after judgment, defendant
filed its motion for new trial, which, after argument, was
denied and the case is now before this court on appeal
both from the judgment and the order denying the motion for new trial.
It should be observed at this point that plaintiffs'
complaint contained a second cause of action, which at
the trial was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs with prejudice and upon their own motion. (R. 44) Consequently,
matters relating to the second cause of action are not before this court.
The record in this case shows without dispute that
prior to 1949, plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Sr., made
plans and preparations for going into the turkey raising
business. Neither Nalder, Sr. nor Jr. had ever engaged in
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that business before that time. (T. 80-81) Among other
preparations which Nalder Sr. had made was to build and
equip a brooder house capable of receiving about 6,000
turkey poults. (T. 18) In 1949, H. William Nalder, Sr.
made a partnership arrangement with his son, H. William
Nalder, Jr. and they jointly launched their turkey business. (T. 16-17, 138)
It should here be noted that plaintiff, Catherine Nalder, wife of H. William Nalder, Sr., was not a member of
the partnership, and had no interest in the enterprise. Notwithstanding this fact, the trial court entered judgment in
Mrs. Nalder's favor. Concerning this action of the trial
court, we shall have more to say hereafter.
Because N alder Sr. and Jr. were financially unable to
carry on the turkey business without credit for each of
the years 1949, 1950, 1951, they entered into a contract
with the defendant whereby, in exchange for their agreement to use defendant's feed preparations, defendant
agreed to advance the cost of turkey poults and the necessary feed to grow and mature them for market. Turkey
finance agreements for 1949, 1950 and 1951 are involved
in this case. All were the same except for variation in
amount and year, and defendant's Exhibit 1, which is the
contract for 1949, is typical of the other two. To secure
the defendant for these advances, and in addition to signing the turkey finance contracts, Nalder Sr. and Jr., each
year for the three years in question, signed and delivered
to defendant promissory notes for the estimated amount
of their requirements and secured the notes with chattel
mortgages upon the turkeys and their machinery and equipment used in the business. The promissory notes are not
in the record, but the chattel mortgages are part of the
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record as Exhibits uA-1," ttA-2," and uA-3." It will be
specifically observed that neither the turkey finance contracts nor the chattel mortgages were signed by plaintiff,
Catherine Nalder. Here again it is pertinent to point out
that notwithstanding this fact, judgment was entered by
the trial court in Mrs. Nalder's favor for damages for defendant's failure or refusal to release these chattel mortgages, which she never signed. This action of the trial
court can only be accounted for upon the theory that she
sustained damage because they were not released. The
only proof of damage in the record relates solely to the
turkey business in which Mrs. Nalder had no interest. Our
comments with regard to this most startling action of the
trial court will likewise be discussed hereafter.
The financing provided by defendant for 1949 was
about $26,000.00. This was made up of an initial estimate of $24,000.00 which proved to be insufficient. Sometime before September 14, 1949, it was determined that
an additional $2,000.00 would be needed and defendant
was requested to and did advance this additional sum.
This advance was secured by a real estate mortgage upon
the home of Mr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. (Ex. ttC-2"; T. 2122, 86-87, Ex. 2-1, Ex. 2-2, T. 90, 259, 267)
Plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Jr., did not execute
this mortgage or any other real estate mortgage involved
in this case. Entirely inconsistent with this fact, the trial
court proceeded to award him damages for defendant's
alleged refusal to release real estate mortgages and added
a penalty in a like amount to the actual damages found to
have been sustained.
Late in the year 1949, the turkey crop raised to maturity by Nalder Sr. and Jr. was processed and placed in
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storage. Between April, 1950 and July, 1950, this crop
was sold with a resulting loss of over $6,000.00. Out of
the original 6,000 poults with which the Nalders began
operations, they matured 3,400 birds. They lost 1,400
birds in the brooder and 1,000 more during the season.
(Ex. uD", Tr. 22, 26, 46, 41, 81, 86, 121)
In spite of the 1949 loss the defendant agreed to and
did finance the Nalders' 1950 operations. Under the 1950
chattel mortgage (Ex. uA-2") defendant advanced $23,300.00. As in 1949 the estimate for the 1950 crop
proved inadequate and responsive to the N alders' request,
defendant made additional advances of $3,600.00. To
secure the additional advance Nalders gave defendant another real estate mortgage (Ex. uC-9") which included
the unpaid 1949 debt totaling $6,555.12 of which
$5,627.39 was principal and $927.73 was accrued interest.
(Exs. uC-9", 4, uC-8", uD", uy"; Tr. 86, 93, 94, 258,
259, 267, 268).
In April, 1950, Mr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. executed a
real estate mortgage (Ex. uC-3") which was recorded but
under which no advances were ever made. The real estate
mortgages of April 1, 1950 and August 15, 1950 (Ex.
uC-3" and uC-9") contained the specific provision that
they were given to secure any and all debts owing by Mr.
and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. and Jr. to defendant. The promissory notes secured by the mortgage of August 15, 19 50
(Ex ... C-9") were dated July 28, 1950 (Ex. uC-8" and
Ex. 4).
The result of the 1950 operation was that Nalders
were able to pay off all advances made for that year with
a surplus of about $1,000.00 which was applied to pay
accrued interest on the 1949 debt owing defendant. (Tr.
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27; Exs. uE-5", uD") Something like 5,000 birds were
raised and marketed that year.
In 1951 the Nalders raised about 6,000 turkeys. (Tr.
3 3, 110; Ex. ((D") From the 19 51 operation the N alders
made about $400.00 over and above the costs and expense
incurred in raising and marketing. (Ex. uD", uF-9-15",
Ex. ui-8"; Tr. 35, 40, 41, 44-46) They operated that
year under a financing program calling for 125% of estimated cost and gave their note and chattel mortgage securing the financing for $42,825.00. (Ex. uA-3")
The record clearly reflects that defendant made all of
the advances that were required to enable Nalder, Sr. and
Jr. to raise turkeys in 1949, 1950 and 1951 (Tr. 83, 88-9,
262, 268-69)
The portions of the record above referred to also reflect the results of the N alders' turkey operations. In addition, it is significant to add plaintiffs' own appraisal of
the success which they had achieved, made prior to the
time that they asserted any claim that defendant had destroyed their business for which it should pay them
$129,700.80. They clearly acknowledged without equivocation their complete failure to operate their business successfully. (Ex. uF-4", uF-21 ", Ex. ul")
At the end of 1951 defendant declined to finance
Nalder, Sr. and Jr. any longer. They had failed to substantially reduce the amount of their indebtedness to defendant which had been carried over from 1949t In addition, irregularities were discovered in Nalders' dealings
with defendant. They had sold turkeys covered by defendant's 1951 chattel mortgage and had not accounted
for the proceeds (Ex. uF-4", uF-16"; Tr. 36, 38, 43-45,
111, 112) In fact they never did account for all the
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turkeys which they raised that year though repeated demands for an accounting were made.
Late in the fall of 1951 a conference was held between the Nalders and Mr. Williams and Mr. Aust representing the defendant for the purpose of discussing the
liquidation of the amount owing defendant. H. William
Nalder, Sr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. met Mr. Williams and
Mr. Aust at the Hotel Utah. It is their contention that
when the subject of financing for 1952 was raised Williams
not only refused to extend further credit but went further and threatened that he would prevent the Nalders
from getting credit elsewhere. (Tr. 47, 107-8, 113-16,
177-79, 182, 184-5) This is emphatically denied by Williams. (Tr. 265-67, 269) Far more persuasive than
N alders' claims are letters and documents which reflect
that no such threat was ever voiced, much less carried out.
(Ex ... F-16-25", Ex. 3, Ex. ((G-2") Nalder, Jr. did not
think that defendant had displayed a threatening attitude
for he voiced his understanding in language the exact
opposite of such a situation. (Ex. uF-16") Furthermore,
he states that his father had told him the exact opposite ·of
what his parents testified to at the trial. (Tr. 156) Instead of making threats defendant made repeated offers to
give any company willing to finance plaintiffs a subordination of its claim provided plaintiffs in return would account for and pay $3 52.00 which was the sum plaintiffs
had received from the sale of turkeys illegally sold in violation of the terms of the 1951 chattel mortgage. (Tr.
115-17, 135, 195, Ex. ((F-16-25," 3, ((G-2") The plaintiffs
recognized their obligation to make this accounting and
attempted to comply.
In their testimony at the trial plaintiffs contended
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that they had the facilities and intended to raise 14,000
turkeys each year for 1952, 1953 and 1954 had financing
been available to enable them to do so. It is of utmost
importance to point out that notwithstanding such claims
in the prior years of 1949, 1950 and 1951, their operation
had never exceeded 6,000 birds and they never, at any
time, raised or marketed more than that number. (Tr. 81,
27, 33; Ex. uD") Furthermore, in the years 1950 and
195'1 they had exactly the same facilities available to them
as were available in 1952, 1953 and 1954 when both of
them working together never exceeded 6,000 birds in their
joint operation. (Tr. 18, 50, 60, 48, 132 and 153)
During the trial the matter of the efforts of plaintiffs
to secure other financing for 1952, 1953 and 1954, after
defendant refused to extend further credit at the end of
1951, was testified to at great length. Several applications
made by either Nalder, Jr. or Nalder, Sr. were introduced
and received in evidence. (Exs. uG", uH", ui" and HQ")
None of these applications received favorable action and
no credits were advanced under them. Plaintiffs contend
that they were never able to find out the reasons for the
rejection of their applications until just prior to the time
this action was brought when they finally learned that the
mortgages described in their complaint were unreleased.
(Tr. 76-7, 102, 158-9, 163-4, 180) They asserted that
they had been led to believe all of those mortgages had
been released but finally conceded on cross examination
that since the debt represented by the real estate mortgage
(Ex. uC-9") had never been paid they were not entitled
to a release of that particular mortgage. (Tr. 108, 164)
With respect to all other mortgages, both chattel and real
estate, they asserted they were entitled to releases either be-
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cause of promises made by the defendant or because the
sums advanced had been repaid. The record does not support plaintiffs' contention and especially with respect to
the real estate mortgages of April and August, 1950 (Exs.
uC-3" and ((C-9") because both mortgages expressly provided that they were to secure all indebtedness then existing or accruing thereafter by all the plaintiffs to defendant
until the same was paid in full. The indebtedness represented by these mortgages was never in fact paid. These
two real estate mortgages totaled on their face the sum
of $13,276.92.
In testifying concerning the execution and delivery
of the real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950 (Ex.
uC-9") Nalder, Sr. made the statement that it was given
to defendant with the promise that the chattel mortgage
for 1949 (Ex. ((A -1 ") would be released. This promise
on defendant's behalf was attributed to a salesman in defendant's employ, and testified to over the repeated and
strenuous objections of defendant as to its competency.
There was no evidence of authority or agency in said salesman to make such a promise. Furthermore, the undisputed record is to the effect that he had no such authority.
(Ex. ttY", Tr. 217, 256-8, 263-5)
Plaintiffs further contended that they were entitled
to and promised releases of the chattel mortgages for 1950
and 1951. (Exs. nA-2", ((A-3") No such promise was
ever made or if made there was no showing that it was
binding on defendant. (Ex. ((E-5" and ((E-6") Defendant,
in retaining all of the mortgages of record, was acting upon
the instruction and advice of counsel not to release any
mortgages so long as prior existing indebtedness was not
paid for the reason that in the opinion of such counsel
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defendant would be jeopardizing its rights by doing s<J.
(Tr. 211-12, 266, 270)
At the very time that plaintiffs contend their business was being harmed by defendant's unreleased mortgages, the record is without dispute that in addition to the
real estate mortgages held by defendant (Ex. uC-3" and
uC-9") totaling $13,276.92, Nalder, Sr. had a real estate
mortgage for $9,000.00 on the same property described
in defendant's mortgage with Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association which was of record in Davis County,
Utah. (Exs. uH" and uQ") And at the same time there
was of record in the same county against Nalder, Jr. a real
estate mortgage for $2,500.00 and a chattel mortgage for
$2,500.00 (Ex. ul"). These various mortgages totaled
$27,276.69.
Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that the
plaintiffs were regarded as poor financial risks. (Ex.
ul-6") In addition there was no evidence offered to show
that defendant's various applications would have been
accepted even though all defendant's mortgages had been
released. (Tr. 243, 246, 249-51)
Finally, no demand for release of real estate mortgages was ever made by plaintiffs and no demand for the
release of chattel mortgages was made until the end of
1953 or early 1954. (Ex. uJ-3", Tr. 104, 106, 140-43,
113, 16 3, 179, 18 2) The chattel mortgages were all released on March 11, 1954. (Ex. uB-1", uB-2" and HB-3")
During the trial numerous objections to the introduction of evidence and the propriety of counsel's questions
were raised to no avail. These matters will be referred
to and argued hereafter.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1

IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAINriFF, CATHERINE NALDER, THE TRIAL COURT
:::OMMITTED ERROR BECAUSE THE UNDISPUT~D EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PLAINriFF HAD NO INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS
:::LAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INJURED BY THE ACT
JF DEFENDANT.
Point 2

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
!\WARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR. FOR DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED
WRONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGES TO WHICH HE WAS NEVER A PARTY.
Point 3

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DOUBLE THE AMOUNT
OF ACTUAL DAMAGES FOUND BY HIM TO HAVE
BEEN SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE OF
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED WRONGFUL FAILURE
:)R REFUSAL TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND ERRED FURTHER IN AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, CATHERINE NALDER,
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE SUCH
MORTGAGES.
Point 4

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
!\WARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE
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OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE OR RE
FUSAL TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE~
BECAUSE NO DEMAND OR REQUEST FOR SUCf.
RELEASES WAS EVER MADE, AND FOR THE ADDITIONAL REASON THAT PLAINTIFFS NEVER
PAID OR OTHERWISE DISCHARGED THE OBLIGATION SECURED BY SAID MORTGAGES.
Point 5

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
AWARDING DAMAGES FOR THE ALLEGED
WRONGFUL FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES:
(A) BECAUSE NO DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF SUCH MORTGAGES WAS MADE UNTIL
THE END OF 1953 OR EARLY 1954, AND
(B) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE
SECURED THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAINTIFFS, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. WHICH
WAS NOT PAID, HENCE NO RELEASE COULD BE
DEMANDED, AND
(C) BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PLAINTIFFS,
H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. COULD NOT
HAVE SECURED 1954 FINANCING AFTER RELEASE OF SAID MORTGAGES WAS DELIVERED
BY DEFENDANT ABOUT MARCH 11, 1954.
Point 6

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
APPLYING AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICIPATED
PROFITS FOR THE YEARS 1952, 1953 AND 1954.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Point 7

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE, OVER DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS tcM," HN''
AND uo" FOR THE REASON THAT SAID EXHIBITS WERE INCOMPETENT, IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
OF LOST PROFITS.
Point 8

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER ITS REAL ESTATE
OR CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H.
WILLIAM NALDER, SR., AND JR.
•

Point 9

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.
Point 10

TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS THAT SCOVILLE, EREKSON
AND SCHINKER PROMISED OR AGREED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE MORTGAGES
WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF AGENCY
OR AUTHORITY OF SAID PERSONS TO MAKE
SUCH PROMISES, AND FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY
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ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PERSONS HAD NO
SUCH AUTHORITY.
Point 11

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND IN NUMEROUS RULINGS ON OBJECTIONS TO LEADING
AND OTHER IMPROPER QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY COUNSEL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF, CATHERINE NALDER, THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED ERROR BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PLAINTIFF HAD NO INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS
CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INJURED BY THE ACT
OF DEFENDANT.
The whole theory of plaintiffs' case rests upon the
proposition that a business was damaged because of a failure of defendant to release the mortgages described in
plaintiffs' complaint. It should require no citation of
authority to support the contention that before such damage could ever be recovered it would have to be first shown
that the party claiming such damage owned an interest
in the business claimed to have been injured. Notwithstanding such elementary requirement, the trial court not
only proceeded to award to the plaintiff, Catherine Nalder, such damages without proof of her ownership of an interest therein, but even more startling awarded her damages in the face of her husband's testimony that the busi-
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ness in question belonged to him and his son exclusively.
(Tr. 16-17) That this is true is apparent from the fact
that Mrs. Nalder never signed any of the chattel mortgages involved in this case or the turkey finince contracts
which were a part of each transaction between defendant
and plaintiffs, H. William Nalder, Sr. and Jr. (Exs. teA-l",
HA-2", tcA-3")
We shall cite cases hereinafter which clearly rule that
before damages for loss of future or anticipated profits
may be recovered, it must be shown that such a business
is in existence and is well established. To award damages
for injury to property not belonging to the claimant is
so palpably erroneous that such judgment cannot possibly
stand.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR. FOR DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED
WRONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGES TO WHICH HE WAS NEVER A
PARTY.
Sec. 57-3-8, UCA 1953, is a highly penal statute providing that a mortgagee shall be liable to a mortgagor for
double the amount of actual damage sustained by him ·
because of the mortgagee's failure to discharge or release
a real estate mortgage after the same has been fully satisfied. That statute was the basis of an award of $48,767.40
actual damages, plus an equal amount of punitive damages
to the plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Jr., upon the ground
that defendant did not release certain real estate mortgages executed and delivered to defendant by plaintiffs,
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H. William Nalder, Sr. and his wife. It will be observed
that the statute is explicit in its terms in allowing such
damages only to a mortgagor. The record in this case
shows upon its face that plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Jr.
did not execute any of the real estate mortgages described
in plaintiffs' complaint and was therefore not a mortgagor.
There is no evidence in the record from which the
trial court could possibly find whether damages, if any,
flowed from the failure to release the real estate mortgages
or from the failure to release chattel mortgages. And the
trial court made no finding whatsoever upon this vital
aspect of the case. If damage flowed from the real estate
mortgages, then H. William Nalder, Jr. could be awarded
nothing because he was never a mortgagor in any real
estate mortgage. On the other hand if damage flowed
only partly from defendant's failure to release real estate
mortgages and partly from its failure to release chattel
mortgages, there is nothing in the record from which a
determination can be made as to how much flowed from
each cause. The trial court made no attempt to segregate
or separate the damages either as to the cause or to apportion the damages between the plaintiffs. This omission
is fatal to the affirmance of the judgment which was rendered.
It is earnestly submitted that the action of the trial
court was a flagrant violation of defendant's rights and
demands the reversal of the judgment rendered. By his
intemperate and ill-considered judgment, the trial court
awarded damages (1) to Catherine Nalder, who was entitled to no damages at all, and (2) awarded punitive damages to H. William N alder, Jr. for an alleged act of defendant for which he was not entitled to invoke the
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statute relied upon to support this judgment, and ( 3)
made no proper finding as to the cause of plaintiff's damage.
POINT 3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DOUBLE THE AMOUNT
OF ACTUAL DAMAGES FOUND BY HIM TO HAVE
BEEN SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE OF
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED WRONGFUL FAILURE
OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND ERRED FURTHER IN AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, CATHERINE NALDER,
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE SUCH
MORTGAGES.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs did not invoke the provisions of Sec. 9-1-4, UCA 1953 in their complaint which
provides a penalty against a chattel mortgagee, who, after
demand, refuses to release a chattel mortgage which has
been fully performed by the mortgagor, plaintiffs nevertheless grounded their claim to damages against defendant upon that statute as well as upon Sec. 57-3-8, supra.
Under Sec. 9-1-4, supra, a different rule of damages applies than governs the case of an unreleased real estate
mortgage. Under the first statute, punitive damages are
limited to $50.00.
In addition to the error of awarding damages to Mrs.
Nalder upon the ground of defendant's failure to release
both real estate and chattel mortgages, to which she was
plainly not entitled, as hereinbefore pointed out, the error
was further compounded when an award of double damage was made to all plaintiffs, for the failure of defendant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

to release chattel mortgages. In his findings the trial court
determined that damage was caused by defendant's failure
to release usatis:fied" mortgages. This clearly implies damage from chattel mortgages. How much of the damage
arose from this cause we are left utterly in the dark to
speculate upon. But whatever the damage from such
cause, the trial court was not at liberty to double the
amount arising from that cause. Thus, the trial court
applied the penal provisions of the statute governing real
estate mortgages in favor of all plaintiffs, and ignored entirely the rule of damages applicable to chattel mortgages.
Furthermore, the remedies of Sec. 9-1-4 are available only
to a mortgagor but those remedies were applied to award
damages to Mrs. Nalder who was not a chattel mortgagor.
These errors are of such basic importance that their commission vitiates the judgment regardless of any meritorious characteristics which it might otherwise possess.
POINT 4
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE
OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES BECAUSE NO DEMAND OR REQUEST FOR SUCH RELEASES WAS EVER MADE, AND FOR THE ADDITIONAL REASON THAT PLAINTIFFS NEVER
PAID OR OTHERWISE DISCHARGED THE OBLIGATION SECURED BY SAID MORTGAGES.
In 56 A.L.R. at page 337 it is stated:
uA notice or request to the mortgagee that he
enter a satisfaction or execute a release of the mortgage is a condition precedent to a right of action
for the penalty." (Citing cases)
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In the record now before the court there is no evidence
that defendant was ever requested by the plaintiffs to release its real estate mortgages. In fact, no such demand was
ever made by plaintiffs. The cases are well settled on the
proposition that such a demand must be made. See 56
A.L.R. 337 supra. See also Interna.tional Harvester Co.
v. Simpson, (Ala.,) 13 3 So. 4, applying this rule to chattel
mortgages.
Statutes of the kind similar to 57-3-8, UCA,
1953, relied upon by plaintiffs, are highly penal in character and are to be strictly construed. The courts are practically unanimous in their reluctance or refusal to enforce
such statutes until mortgagees have had every reasonable
opportunity to comply with their provisions. This court
has construed the Utah statute in the case of Shibata v.
Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P. 2d 251, and
has held that the section is penal and must be strictly construed.
A fact of even greater significance, which the trial
court totally ignored, is that the record shows that the
real estate mortgages of August 1 and August 15, 1950
(Exs. ((C-3" and ((C-9") were never satisfied, hence plaintiffs at no time had a right to demand releases. In both
mortgages referred to, this provision was inserted:
((In addition to the foregoing amount of
$6,721.80 ($6,555.12) this mortgage shall secure
all other sums due and to become due from H. William Nalder, Sr. and Catherine Nalder, his wife,
and H. William Nalder, Jr., and Mrs. H. William
Nalder, Jr., his wife, in favor of Kellogg Sales
Company."
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At the time these mortgages were executed, plaintiffs, H.
William Nalder, Sr. and Jr. were indebted to defendant
for the amount recited in said mortgages. It should, therefore, be evident that by the express terms of these mortgages the plaintiffs could not require a release until all indebtedness owing to the defendant had been paid in full.
Never, at any time, have the plaintiffs attempted to deny
that they owed the amount recited in these mortgages and
the trial court so found. (See Finding #9, R. 23) The
N alders themselves recognized the validity of those mortgages and admitted the right of the defendant to retain
them of record. (Tr. 108, 164) In addition, the 1949 real
estate mortgage was never satisfied because the debt owing,
which was secured in part by that mortgage, was never
paid. Hence, the plaintiffs were not entitled to demand
its release. It must, therefore, be apparent that the judgment awarded by the court for the failure to release real
estate mortgages cannot stand, because the conditions
which would have entitled the plaintiffs to the relief under the statutes relied upon did not exist.
POINT 5
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
AWARDING DAMAGES FOR THE ALLEGED
WRONGFUL FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES:
(A) BECAUSE NO DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF SUCH MORTGAGES WAS MADE UNTIL
THE END OF 1953 OR EARLY 1954, AND
(B) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE
SECURED THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAINTIFFS, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. WHICH
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WAS NOT PAID, HENCE NO RELEASE COULD BE
DEMANDED, AND
(C) BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PLAINTIFFS,
H. \VILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. COULD NOT
HAVE SECURED 1954 FINANCING AFTER RELEASE OF SAID MORTGAGES WAS DELIVERED BY
DEFENDANT ABOUT MARCH 11, 1954.
Section 9-1-4, UCA, 1953, provides:
((After the full performance of the conditions
of the mortgage any mortgagee, agent, assignee or
legal representative who shall willfully neglect, for
the space of ten days after being requested, to discharge the same shall be liable to the mortgagor or
his assigns in the sum of $50 punitive damages and
also for all actual damages sustained by such neglect
or refusal."
The record in this connection is without dispute that no
demand was ever made for the release of chattel mortgages
until the end of 1953 or early 1954. By the unequivocal
terms of the statute which this court has said, in ruling
upon the companion statute, requires strict construction,
there can be no penalty assessed for failure to release until
after demand. Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, supra.
Notwithstanding this fact, the trial court awarded to the
plaintiffs a judgment for purported loss of profits sustained in 1952 and 1953, which losses, if sustained at all,
were suffered prior to any demand for a release having
been made. It must be apparent, therefore, that the judgment in this respect is fatally defective.
Releases of chattel mortgages were executed on the
21st of January, 1954, and were recorded in the office
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of the Clerk of Davis County, Utah, March 11, 1954.
(Ex. ((B") It is submitted that there is no evidence that
these plaintiffs sustained any damage for failure to release
these chattel mortgages between the time when the demand was made and the time when the releases were
placed of record. The releases were filed before the beginning of the 1954 turkey season and there is no scintilla of
evidence by which it was shown that they were not released in time for the plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, to have secured financing for their 1954 operations. The record shows (Ex. uW") that the plaintiffs
1951 turkey poults were not delivered until April 3, May
4, and May 11, 1951 respectively, and Exhibit uD-1"
shows that the turkeys raised in 19'49 were not
hatched until April 29, 1949, and Exhibit uD-3" shows
that the turkeys raised that year were hatched March 1
and May 7 respectively, and Exhibit uD-5" shows that
the turkeys raised in 19 51 were hatched March 9 and
May 10 respectively, and Exhibit up" shows that in 1953
the N alders started on April 3, 19 53. Furthermore, assuming that there is any liability for the failure to release
chattel mortgages in relation to damages claimed for 1954,
in the absence of evidence to show that damage was actually sustained by reason of that fact, the awarded damages could not in any event exceed $50.00.
In the face of what has just been pointed out, the trial
court awarded these plaintiffs its judgment for alleged
losses in 1954 of $10,116.00 and assessed a like amount as
a penalty. Each of the chattel mortgages under consideration contained this provision:
((Provided that if the mortgagor shall pay or
cause to be paid unto Kellogg Sales Company or
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its assigns the indebtedness above set forth on demand as evidenced by his note or notes, together
with interest as therein provided and shall further
pay or cause to be paid such other further and future indebtedness whether evidenced by promissory note or not as the mortgagor may hereafter
incur to the mortgagee, it being the intent hereof

to secure the said mortgagee any advance or credit
now made or hereafter made * * * or any other
advancement or credits extended * * ::- ."
Thus, by the very terms of these chattel mortgages they
were given to secure existing indebtedness no matter how
originating. It is undisputed in the record that there was
unpaid indebtedness going back to the inception of the
business relationship between the parties. The law is well
settled that taking a new chattel mortgage in the absence
of intent does not satisfy a pre-existing indebtedness.
Pacific Nat. Ag. Credit Corp. v. Wilbur, Cal. 42 P. 2d 314:
((The acceptance of the new note and mortgage as a renewal of the former note and mortgage
in the absence of evidence of any agreement that
the new note and mortgage should be accepted in
payment and satisfaction of the old does not operate as an extinguishment or discharge of the latter."

McGown vs. Fuller, (Wyo.) 266 Pac. 124 involved a whole
series of chattel mortgages given over a period of many
years, and the Supreme Court of Wyoming held in that
case that each new mortgage was a renewal or continuation
of the previous one and was intended to secure the original
debt which was never paid, even though the amount varied from time to time. Likewise, see Lupe Discount Corp.
v. Holleb f3 Co., (Ill.) 47 N.E. 2d. at 337.
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It is the position and contention of defendant that
each new chattel mortgage taken by it included the past
due and unpaid debt of Nalder, Sr. and Jr., and that consequently no right to demand a release of any chattel mortgage existed, even assuming that a proper demand for release was made, until the debt secured by those mortgages
was paid in full, including the amount still unpaid from the
1949 operations of the mortgagors. Certainly, in view of
the record, there never existed any right to a release of the
1949 chattel mortgage and we contend the same construction must be applied to the chattel mortgages given in
1950 and 1951 as well. Plaintiffs attempted to escape the
consequences of their failure to pay the amount due under
the 1949 chattel mortgage by contending that defendant
promised in exchange for their agreement to execute the
real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950 (Ex. HC-9) that
the 1949 chattel mortgage would be released. Defendant
denied any such agreement and we shall discuss under another heading of this brief why plaintiff's contention is
untenable. Plaintiffs knew that defendant did not accept
this real estate mortgage in payment and discharge of the
1949 chattel mortgage. (Tr. 24)
POINT 6
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
APPLYING AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES
TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICIPATED PROFITS FOR THE YEARS 1952, 1953 AND
1954.
In order to sustain a judgment in their favor, the
plaintiffs were required to show that as a result of defendant's wrongful conduct they sustained damage. They
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contended that this damage was in loss of profits during
the years 1952, 1953 and 1954, after the defendant declined to furnish any further financing of their operations,
and as they stoutly contend, resulted because defendant's
mortgages prevented them from obtaining financing elsewhere. Loss of profits, like any other damage, must be
proven before any recovery may be had for such a loss.
The same rules of certainty and definiteness apply to future profits as apply to any other type of damage. Also,
conjecture, speculation and guessing are as objectionable
in proving such losses as they would be in any claim for
damages.
It is conceded that a loss of future or anticipated profits due either to breach of contract or tort may be recovered in an action for damages. The following authorities
are in accord with this rule:

States v. Durkin, (Kan.) 68. Pac. 1091.
Schultz v. Wells Butchers' Supply, (Wash.)
275 Pac. 737.
Outcault Advertising Co. v. Citizens' Nat.
Bank of E1nporia, (Kan.) 234 Pac. 988.
However, that does not permit the claimant to recover
such a loss by merely claiming that except for the interference of defendant his profits would have been so much
money. He must establish a basis for his claim in order to
recover. The requirement is that of proof with reasonable certainty.
Claims for loss of anticipated or future profits by
their very nature are speculative and uncertain. The general rule applicable to damages is that damages in order
to be recoverable must be certain. The rule is stated in the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 912 as follows:
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~~A person to whom another has tortiously
caused harm is entitled to compensatory damages
therefor if, but only if, he establishes by proof the
extent of such harm and the amount of money
representing adequate compensation with such certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit."

The rule is further stated in the case of Steiner v. Long
Beach Local No. 128, (Cal.) 123 P. 2d 20, page 27 as follows:
((Generally speaking, the principle underlying
the right to damages for injury is that the person
injured is entitled to compensation commensurate
with his loss. It is not sufficient to prove the infringement of a legal right; to recover more than
merely nominal damages, the injured person must
prove the amount or items of the damage suffered
by them. As stated in 25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 144,
P. 788, ~As noted in Sec. 6 supra, a presumption of
at least nominal damage follows from proof of a
legal wrong. However, the amount and items of
pecuniary damage are not presumed, but must be
proved; and if there is no evidence as to the extent of the pecuniary loss there can be no recovery
of substantial damages, at least where the elements
of damage are such as to be susceptible of pecuniary
admeasurement.' The rule is applicable to a tortious
interference with a business::- * * ."
And in Grupe v. Glick, (Cal.) 160 P. 2d 832, the following
is stated:
((An award of damages for the detriment occasioned by the loss of future profits is subject to
the general rule that the amount which, except for
the defendant's wrongful act, would have come to
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the plaintiff, must be certain and must have been
within the contemplation of the parties when they
contracted."
In the abstract opinion to Blakely Printing Co. v. Fort
Dearborn Mercantile Co., (Ill.) 53 N.E. 2d at page 55, the
headnotes are as follows:
ttln action for breach of contract, a party seeking damages for loss of profits must show reality
of loss and that breach was proximate cause thereof."
And in Krikorian v. Dailey, (Va.) 197 S.E. 442 at page
448, the rule is stated thus:
((Profits may only be recovered where they can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty."
The above cases amply demonstrate that even in cases involving loss of future profits the rule of certainty must
be met to sustain a judgment for damages. Defendant concedes that with the proper proof recovery can be obtained
for the loss of such profits. Even though in such cases certain elements of speculation and uncertainty exist, the
courts will permit a recovery in spite of such uncertainty
if, but only if, some reasonable formula or basis is sustained
upon which recovery may rest. Succinctly stated, the rule
applying to such cases is that any loss of future profits
must be related to the experience of the claimant prior to
the time of the commission of the wrongful act. The rule
is stated in the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 912, page 578
as follows:
ttAs a condition to recovery for loss of earnings, the person harmed must offer evidence, convincing to the trier of fact, that a substantial
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amount of earnings has been lost. To do this he
must introduce evidence of the amount of earnings received prior to the time of the injury, or the
amount which he was capable of obtaining, and at
least some evidence having a tendency to show that
he could have earned something during the period
in which loss of earnings is claimed."
And with respect to the same rules of law applicable to
loss of profits resulting from breach of contract, the Restatement on Contracts, Sec. 331, P. 515 states the rule as
follows:
uDamages are recoverable for losses caused or
for profits and other gains prevented by the breach
only to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money
with reasonable certainty."
A leading case on this subject decided by the Supreme
Court of Oregon is Willia111s v. Island City Mercantile f5
Milling Co. 3 7 Pac. 49. That case involved a claim for
loss of future profits growing out of breach of contract.
That court stated the following in the course of its opinIOn:

uwe are aware the authorities are not uniform
on this question but it seems to us the rule we have
indicated is more likely to do justice between the
parties to this record than the one adopted by the
trial court. The anticipated or expected profits
from the operation of a flouring mill are proverbially uncertain and contingent, and to allow
them, as such, to be recovered as damages in an
action for a breach of contract to furnish machinery and appliances for such mill is to allow the jury
to enter into the realm of speculation and uncer-
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tainty. As said by Mr. Justice Cooley in Allis v.
McLean, supra, a case similar to the one at bar:
(Estimates of profits seldom take all contingencies
into the account, and are therefore seldom realized;
and, if damages for breach of contract were to be
determined on estimates of probable profits, no
man could know in advance the extent of his responsibility. It is therefore very properly held, in
cases like the present, that the party complaining
·of a breach of contract must point out elements of
damage more certain and more directly traceable
to the injury than prospective profits can be'::-::-::-."
uwe are of the opinion, therefore, that the
true measure of damages for the failure to complete
the contract within the time stipulated, and for
the loss of time occasioned by the attempts of the
plaintiffs, after September 20th, to comply with
the terms of their contract, is the reasonable value
of the use of the mill during such time, as ascertained from the past experience of the defendant.
::- ::- ::- The ruling announced by the court as to the
measure of damages for the difference between the
actual and guaranteed capacity of the mill was, we
think, correct, beca.use it was based upon past transactions; and it is a mere matter of mathematical
calculation to determine the difference between the
actual output of a 45 barrel capacity mill and what
the output would have been during the same time,
had the mill been up to the guarantied capacity."
And in the case of Chain Belt Co. v. U. S., (United
States Court Claims), 115 F. Supp. 701, a quotation is
made from the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 3 3 1 ( 2 ) (d) :
ulf the defendant's breach has prevented the
plaintiff from carrying on a well established busi-
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ness, the amount of profits thereby prevented is
often capable of proof with reasonable certainty.
On the basis of its past history, a reasonable prediction can be made as to its future."
The same section quoted from the Restatement of Contracts quoted above is reiterated.
And in the case of William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of the United States, 42 Fed. 2d 152, the
recovery of such damages was permitted upon the testimony of the treasurer of the plaintiff comparing the business net profits in one year with the treasurer's knowledge
of business conditions when the company was free from
unlawful interference and from this the plaintiffs' probable yearly earnings was estimated. In Shell Oil Co. v.
State Tire & Oil Co., 126 Fed. 2d 971, it was held that the
jury could consider evidence concerning the plaintiff's
profits for a reasonable time before any wrongful conduct
by the defendant and compare those profits with reduced
profits or losses ensuing as a direct result of the wrongful
action of defendant.
This court in the case of Jenkins v. Morgan-Vt.-,
260 Pac. 2d 532 at page 535 quotes with approval the case
of Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co., 122
Wash. 220,210 Pac. 366, 367, as follows:
tt:=- * * before special damages for loss of profits
to a general business occasioned by the wrongful
acts of another may be recovered, it must be made
to appear that the business had been in successful
operation for such a period of time as to give it
permanency and recognition, and that such business was earning a profit which could be reasonably
ascertained and approximated."
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In U. S. v. Griffith, Gornall 5 Carman, Inc., (lOth
Circuit), 210 Fed. 2d 11, the Circuit Court of Appeals
said:
HThe loss of future profits from a regularly
established business may in proper cases be established by showing that the profits after the wrong
are less than past profits. 25 C.J.S. Damages, Sec. 90
(citing other cases) ::· ::- *."
((Mathematical exactness as to the amount is
not required but the evidence must form a basis
for a reasonable approximation. The court must
have before it such facts and circumstances to
enable it to make an estimate of damage based upon
judgment, not guesswork. Palmer v. Connecticut
Ry. & Lighting Co., supra. (Actual damages only
may be secured. Those that are speculative, remote, uncertain, may not form the basis of a lawful judgment. The actual damages which will sustain a judgment must be established, not by conjectures or unwarranted estimates of witnesses, but
by facts from which their existence is logically and
legally inferable. The speculations, guesses, estimates of witnesses, form no better basis of recovery
than the speculations of the jury themselves.'"
Turning now from this array of authorities to the
facts in this case, what do we find? The evidence is undisputed that in the years prior to 1952, when there was
no interference from the defendant and when in fact the
defendant was financing the plaintiffs to the full extent
of their operations, their business was a failure. We quote
from the plaintiffs' own statements regarding their business operations. On November 21, 19 51, they wrote defendant as follows:
tt* * ~~- It surely looks bad for us again ::- :z. *
You also know without me telling you, that we
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have made nothing since we went into the turkeys* ::· ::·.
((If we had sold them here when processed we
would have been able to pay Kellogg all we owed
him and had $800.00 over, but as it was we went
$6,000.00 in the hole. ::· * :-'"
((The next year (last year) we were able to
pay Kellogg Company all of last year's bill and
$1,000.00 on interest.
((Mr. Williams, this year the way we had to
feed was also a very costly lesson to us. Our feed
bill this year will be more than $6,000.00 above
what it was last year :-'" * ::· ." (Ex. ((F-4")
Again on April 5, 1952 they wrote the defendant as follows:
tt::. :~o ::· You may say rightly that they have not
been good years::· * ::· ." (Ex. ((F-21")

In those three years they were unable to pay off the 1949
debt owing to the defendant. Did they show as this
court in ] enkins v. Morgan, supra, states they must show
((that the business had been in successful operation for
such a period of time as to give it permanency and recognition, and that such business was earning a profit which
could be reasonably ascertained and approximated?" It
is certain that the record shows exactly the opposite. The
turkey raising business, to para phrase the case of Williams
v. Island City Mercantile f5 Milling Co., supra, is even
more speculative than the milling business and to permit
these plaintiffs to come into court and to testify that in
1952, 1953 and 1954 they would have raised 14,000 turkeys and marketed the same at so much profit per bird
was the purest kind of speculation and was in no way related to their past experience of earnings. It is consequent-
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ly submitted that the judgment rendered cannot stand or
be sustained and the same should be reversed.
Furthermore, the rule is that there can be no damages recovered for anticipated or future profits to be derived from a business only in contemplation in the owner's
mind or which is unestablished. In Jenkins v. Morgan,
supra, this court stated:
((All the authorities are unanimous in holding
that prospective profits to be derived from a business which is not yet established but one merely in
contemplation are generally too uncertain and
speculative to form a basis for recovery."
And the same rule is announced in the Chain Belt Co. v.
United States, supra, in this language:
((Anticipated profits from a business which is
contemplated but not established are too remote
and speculative to form a basis on which to recover
for damages for the reason that there are no facts
from which the amounts of the proceeds can be
determined by the degree of certainty required by
law."
And to the same effect see Grupe v. Glick, supra, where the
court says:
((On the other hand, where the operation of
an unestablished business is prevented or interrupted, damages for prospective profits that might
otherwise have been made from its operation are
not recoverable for the reason that their occurrence
is uncertain, contingent and speculative."
And quoting further:
((For the reason that Grupe's exclusive sales
agency was a new venture, the record does not
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contain any evidence of a past volume of business
in the sale of the particular machine in controversy, showing with reasonable probability that a
fairly certain number of additional sales could have
been made in the future."
And in Krikorian v. Dailey, supra, the court announced
this rule:
cclf the business is new and without background, there is no base from which profits may be
determined ::- * ::- ."
And in Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 12 8, supra, the
California court said the following:
ccWhere an established business is wrongfully
interrupted and injured, the proper measure of
damages is the diminution in value of business
traceable to the wrongful act as reflected by loss
of profits, expenses incurred, or similar concrete
evidences of injury."
See following cases and authorities:
15 Am. Juris. page 573, Sec. 157.
25 Corpus Juris Secundum, P. 518, Sec. 42 (b).

Eastman Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Material Co.,
295 Fed. 98.

Ellerson v. Grove, Circuit Court of Appeals,
4th Circuit, 44 Fed. 2d 493.
Andreopulos v. Peresteredes, (Wash.) 163 Pac.
770.
Goebel v. Haugh, 2 N.W. 847, (Minn.)
Blankenship v. Lanier, (Ala.) 101 So. 763.
Central Coal Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96.
Whitehead v. Cape Henry Syn. (Vir.) 68 S.E.
263.
Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Red Iron Drilling Co., Inc. (La.) 192 )-o. 895.
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Mensing v. Wright, (Kan.) 119 Pac. 374.
Landon v. Hill, 29 Pac. 2d 281, (Cal.)
It is submitted that from the evidence in this record
there was no established business damaged by the actions
of the defendant, even admitting for the purpose of argument only, that they were wrongful and consequently
there can be no damages awarded in favor of the plaintiffs in this case.
Bearing these propositions in mind a reading of the
record discloses that the required tests were not met by
plaintiffs' proof. The plaintiffs testified that in 1952 they
had capacity to handle and care for 14,000 turkeys and
that they would have raised that many birds if the financing had been available. They asserted that for 1953 and
1954 they would have duplicated 1952 by raising the same
number of birds. They next proceeded to show that in
those years, instead of raising 14,000 turkeys, Nalder, Sr.
had only raised 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000 respectively. They
introduced in evidence, over defendant's timely objections,
exhibits purporting to show how much profit was made
on the turkeys actually sold in those years, and that the
profit had been so much per bird. They then took this
figure and computed the difference between the actual
profit and what it would have been if they had raised all
the turkeys which they claimed and insisted they had
capacity and intention to raise. The trial court went along
with this theory and based upon the evidence described,
awarded the damages complained of.

It is contended by defendant that by so doing the
trial court committed further serious and reversible error.
In the first place, it must be most obvious that any
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such proof is highly speculative and uncertain. It is likewise self-serving. For example, what was there to prevent
the plaintiffs from asserting that they would have raised
20,000 or 25,000 turkeys? They could have made such
a claim just as easily as they asserted they would have
raised 14,000 turkeys. Such proof entirely ignores the
possibility that plaintiffs might have quit the turkey business, that they might have had prohibitive losses, or that
market conditions might have been unfavorable so that
granted they actually raised all the birds they claimed they
wanted to raise, the whole operation might be a loss and
not a profit.
The foregoing abundant authority shows the way in
which loss of future or anticipated profits are to be proven.
POINT 7
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE, OVER DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS ttM", ((N"
AND no" FOR THE REASON THAT SAID EXHIBITS WERE INCOMPETENT, IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
OF LOST PROFITS.
Under Point 6 of this brief we have already argued
that the court erred in awarding damages to plaintiffs for
loss of anticipated or future profits because there was no
relationship between the damages awarded and the plaintiffs' experience in the turkey business prior to the alleged
interference by defendant. We now wish to make comment upon the exhibits which the court received over the
objection of defendant from which the court purportedly
made his findings and determination of damages.
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In this connection, Exhibit ttp" was offered to prove
the competence of the Nalders as turkey raisers. Objection
was made because the exhibit was immaterial hearsay evidence taken from books kept by other persons. This objection was summarily overruled by the trial court. Exhibits ((T" and HU" were offered to show the amount and
cost of feed used by H. William Nalder, Sr. in 1953 and
1954. Exhibit ttX" was offered to prove the number of
turkeys purchased from Nalder, Sr. in 1953 by the Lee
Brown Co. Exhibit HW" was offered to show the number
of turkey poults purchased in 1953 and 1954 by H. William Nalder, Sr. and Exhibit HV" was the written offer
of Lee Brown Co. to purchase H. William Nalder, Sr.'s
1954 turkeys. All of the alleged facts shown by said exhibits were supposedly summarized in Exhibits HM", HN"
and ((0", which were offered to prove the damages sustained by all the plaintiffs based upon H. William Nalder,
Sr.'s operations in 1952, 1953 and 1954. In none of those
years did Mrs. Nalder or H. William Nalder, Jr. raise turkeys so that at the outset we are faced with a situation
from which it is impossible for anyone even to speculate
on how much profit they might have made in those years
in the turkey business, even adopting the theory of damages used by plaintiffs. By some mental process unfathomable to defendant, the experience of the plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Sr., was translated into the non-existent experience of H. William N alder, Jr. and Mrs. N alder and
adopted by the court as the experience of H. William
N alder, Jr. and Mrs. N alder in raising turkeys in 19 52,
1953 and 1954. On no other hypothesis could any claim
to damages in favor of H. William Nalder, Jr. or Mrs.
Nalder be postulated. If their past experience in 1949,
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1950 and 1951 had to be relied on as a basis for damages
there could be no finding of damage in their favor because
there was no profit made during those years. Furthermore, H. William Nalder, Jr. abandoned the turkey business in 1952 and never went back to it. (Tr. 146-148)
Mrs. N alder never engaged in the business, much less
abandoned it.
An examination of Exhibits ((M", uN" and ceO"
shows that in computing the expenses for 1952, 1953 and
1954 Nalder, Sr. charged himself for turkey poults, feed,
brooder expense, i.e., electricity, herder (wages) and processing. He deducted these items from the amounts he
claimed he received from the sale of the turkeys and he
then designates all the rest as profit. It seems strange indeed that overnight beginning in 1952, Nalder, Sr. was
by some mysterious necromancy transformed from a failure to an outstanding success, without any logical explanation for the sudden and swift change. Apparently he had
the same facilities in the earlier years, the same know-how
and astuteness, but somehow could not make his enterprise a success. In November, 19 51, the N alders confessed
themselves as failures and the results of their operations
confirmed their confession. A critical examination of
Exhibits ((M", uN" and uo" perhaps will reveal at least
some of the reasons why Nalder, Sr. looked better in 1952,
1953 and 1954 than in those earlier years. In the first
place, he was handling a much smaller flock of turkeys
and perhaps could handle them better. A much more
reasonable explanation, however, lies in the fact that these
exhibits do not reveal the whole picture. Nalder, Sr. fails
to charge his turkey operations with many proper expenses which in all conscience must be charged in every
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properly conducted business enterprise. For instance,
there is no charge made for taxes, loans, interest on borrowed money, depreciation, insurance, maintenance or the
reasonable value of his own labor and time expended in
raising the turkeys. Everyone of such items was undoubtedly incurred. We know he borrowed money "from First
Security Bank with the endorsement of Mr. Rasmussen.
(Tr. 171) It would be naive to believe that the loan was
made without interest or that Nalder, Sr. was not required
to repay the principal. (Tr. 162, 171, 219) The materiality and competence of these exhibits was destroyed by
these omissions and they are worthless for the purpose of
arriving at the profits which were made in 1952, 1953 and
1954. Defendant objected to the introduction of the exhibits and the objections were overruled. These objections
were well taken and the court's action in overruling them
and admitting the exhibits was seriously prejudicial to the
defendant.
POINT 8
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER ITS REAL ESTATE
OR CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H.
WILLIAM NALDER, SR., AND JR.
The judgment awarded by the trial court in this case
rests upon the unsupported conclusion of plaintiffs that
the reason for their inability to obtain turkey financing for
1952, 1953 and 1954 was that the record in the County
Recorder's Office in Davis County, Utah showed the real
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estate and chattel mortgages, pleaded in plaintiffs' complaint, unsatisfied and unreleased. Plaintiffs' asserted their
complete ignorance of the condition of this record until
notified by Mr. Rasmussen of this fact in 1954. (Tr.
163-164, 76-7, 102, 105-6, 158-9, 180) The record will
not support plaintiffs in this claim of ignorance. They
were notified in writing by defendant that the mortgages
were not released twice in 1950. (Ex. uE-5", ((E-6")
Furthermore, the plaintiffs carried on correspondence with
defendant in 1952 and 1953 requesting subordination of
defendant's debt. (Ex. uF-16-25") They could hardly be
ignorant of the fact that the requirement of a subordination agreement by General Mills Co. was for the purpose
of clearing the record of these mortgages and to constitute
the General Mills obligation a first lien. Furthermore,
Nalder, Jr., in his application to General Mills, listed as
one of his liabilities a mortgage payable to defendant.
(Ex. ul-1) In a memorandum dated December, 1951,
reference is made to unreleased chattel mortgages which
would have to be released or subordinated. (Ex. 1-4) Presumably this subject was discussed with Nalder, Jr. for he
made several attempts to get defendant to give him such
a subordination. (Tr. 106-108) See also Exhibit ul-8".
Furthermore, the plaintiffs well understood the purpose of
a subordination agreement. They requested defendant in
1950 to subordinate defendant's debt to the first mortgage
on their home, which request defendant granted. (Tr. 21)
This pretended lack of knowledge by plaintiffs is unconvincing and not very significant except that it gives a good
insight into plaintiffs' willingness to slant testimony to
their own advantage.
Returning now to the more important question of the
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reason why plaintiffs could not get financing for all the
turkeys they assert they wished to raise after 1951, the
record is clear that none of the companies to whom they
made application ever told them that they were so denied
because defendant did not release mortgages. It is clear
that Ralston-Purina did not. (Tr. 169, 177, 180) Neither did General Mills (Ex. HI") nor Farmer's Grain (Tr.
158) nor Pillsbury. (Tr. 159) No one authorized to represent and speak for any lending agency testified directly
or indirectly that his company, except for the mortgages
referred to, would finance the N alders, all or any of them,
to such extent as to raise 14,000 or any number of turkeys.
In the absence of such testimony there is no basis for any
award against defendant.
Nalder, Jr. stated that the General Mills credit manager, Stevens, told him that the application to that company would be approved if subordination of the Kellogg
debt was obtained. (Tr. 159) However, Stevens, plaintiffs' own witness, when asked if such was the fact, definitely refused to confirm that statement. (Tr. 250-52) Stevens made it clear that the application would have required
further consideration by the credit manager in California.
Exhibit ul-6" attests eloquently to the fact that matters
relating to plaintiffs' business ability, credit rating and
general reputation were in serious question. Furthermore,
the General Mills application, if granted, would have limited Nalder, Jr. to 5,000 turkeys, not 14,000.
Rasmussen, a Ralston-Purina feed dealer, testified
that plaintiffs' applications were not approved because of
defendant's unreleased mortgages, but that statement was
nothing but his own unsupported conclusion. (Tr. 136)
He was not an agent of the company and had nothing to
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do with its credit policies. (Tr. 169) If any statement
made by him could have been attributed to Ralston-Purina
it was only hearsay and consequently was inadmissable as
a statement of fact.
It is submitted, therefore, that nothing in the record
will support plaintiffs' contention that had defendant released its mortgages credit would have been available to
them from other sources. If such a contention could be
supported at all, it is only an inference from the fact that
these mortgages were unreleased. The testimony of Stevens and Exhibit ul" destroy even that inference. But, in
addition, there are other facts also in the record which
further weaken or destroy any such inference, if it would
otherwise be permissible at all. None of these other factors
related to defendant's unreleased mortgages. It is defendant's contention that they were quite as much responsible for plaintiff's unsuccessful attempts to get financing
as were the unreleased mortgages of defendant. In fact,
we go further and contend that even in the absence of
any mortgage of record in defendant's name, there is
sound support for the argument that plaintiffs probably
could not have obtained credit elsewhere. We submit that
these other facts, being such as might have prevented plaintiffs from obtaining such credit, the burden of proof was
upon the plaintiffs to show that the other facts to which
we shall now refer were not an obstacle to plaintiffs' financIng.
First of all we repeat that the reference in Exhibit
ul-6" to plaintiffs' unsuccessful turkey operations before
1952; to plaintiffs as upoor financial risks; the deficit from
the 1949 operations, pending litigation, past record of poor
payr~ including collection suits, mortgaging of household
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goods, etc." all pointing to a ustrapped" financial condition, are of more than passing significance on this question
of whether defendant's unreleased mortgages was the only
cause of plaintiffs' difficulty. Furthermore, as we have
already pointed out, two of defendant's real estate mortgages, Exhibits uC-3" and uC-9", were subsisting, valid
and unpaid obligations totaling over $13,000.01>, even if
it were admitted that all other mortgages should have been
released. These two mortgages certainly could be maintained of record until paid because they expressly recited
that they were to secure all of plaintiffs' obligations to defendant. In addition, the Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
Association held a $9,000.00 real estate mortgage on the
home of N alder, Sr. and his wife. The mortgage was referred to in both applications made by plaintiff to RalstonPurina. (Ex. uH" and uQ") It may be presumed that this
mortgage was of record because in 1950 defendant subordinated its then existing real estate mortgage to that
debt. (Tr. 21)
Young Nalder, in his application to General Mills,
(Ex. cci") referred to a chattel mortgage of $2,500.00 and
a real estate mortgage of $2,500.00 and to $2,500.00 of
obligations to defendant. This showed then a total of
$7,500.00 owed by Nalder, Jr. by his own admission. We
believe it may be fairly assumed that these mortgages were
likewise of record. Even eliminating all of defendant's
mortgages, plaintiffs were owing valid obligations of
$16,500.00 to other creditors at the very time they claim
it was only due to defendant's misconduct that their business was destroyed. There is nothing in the record to show
that General Mills, Ralston-Purina, Pillsbury or Farmer's
Grain were not influenced by this credit picture. It is
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only reasonable to assume that at least they might have
been very much influenced by these facts.
That plaintiffs were required to prove defendant's
acts the proximate cause of their damage is elementary.
The case of Ebbert v. First National Bank of Condon,
(Ore.) 279 Pac. 534 is closely analogous to this case in that
in the Condon case the plaintiff likewise was claiming damages because of the alleged wrongful refusal of the defendant bank to release some chattel mortgages. The court
makes these observations:
((The recovery of the item of $37,808.08 was
ventured upon the contention that the defendant
wrongfully and purposely failed to satisfy the
mortgage records and thereby caused the OregonWashington Joint Stock Land Bank of Portland to
reject his application for a mortgage loan in the sum
of $25,000. Before that incident could become an
element of damages, it was necessary that the evidence should show (a) that in ,the absence of the
wrongful act there was a reasonable likelihood that
the loan would have been made, and (b) that the
defendant's neglect caused the rejection of the application."
The court then goes on to recite that in the application for
the loan the plain tiff had listed certain mortgage obligations and had omitted others, including the existence of
the mortgages which it was claimed the defendant should
have released. (Parenthetically, it is most interesting to
observe that in their applications to the Ralston-Purina
Company these plaintiffs omitted any mention of the existence of the mortgages or debt owing to the defendant.)
Also, there was evidence that the applicant had misrepresented certain facts and that was given as a reason for
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turning down the plaintiffs' application. There was a
whole series of chattel mortgages which the plaintiff had
failed to mention in his application, including unpaid
taxes. There was evidence concerning a prospective buyer of the plaintiffs' property which the court discusses. It
was pointed out that at the time the property was in the
process of foreclosure that there was no summer fallow and
that the prospective buyer discovered other mortgages on
the record and that various factors were discovered by him
which persuaded him to discontinue his negotiations, and
then the court says:
((* * ::- Such a remote possibility of injury is
too uncertain to be recoverable as damages. Sutherland on Damages (4th Ed.) 53; Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) Sec. 170. The following apt language of Mr. Justice McBride in Spain v. OregonWashington R. & N. Co., 78 Or. 355, 153 P. 470,
475, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1104, is applicable: (When
the evidence leaves the case in such a situation that
the jury will be required to speculate and guess
which of several possible causes occasioned the injury, that part of the case should be withdrawn
from their consideration.' "
In the case of Shealy's Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. 5 Tel. Co.,
126 Fed. Supp. 382, the plaintiff claimed damages for loss
of business due to the failure of the defendant to publish
an advertisement in its directory. The court held that the
element of damage claimed was so remote and uncertain
under the evidence that no recovery could be allowed.
The plaintiff actually showed that its profits for a nine
months period prior to the breach of contract were greater
when the advertisement appeared in the directory, than
they were during the period when it had been omitted.
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In other words, the plaintiff followed the correct theory
of comparison between past experience and profits during
the period when the wrong was committed. Nevertheless
the court had this to say:
uThe injury suffered, if any, by the plaintiff
was the loss of such profits as would have resulted
from the publishing of the advertisement. Whether
the plaintiff's gross profits would have increased if
the advertisement had been published is a matter
of mere speculation and conjecture. Since the
plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence even
tending to show that its gross sales would have been
increased had the advertisement been published, the
mere fact that the gross profits for a preceding period were in excess of the gross profits for the period during which the advertisement was omitted
from the directory is insufficient to show that the
decrease in gross profits was the proximate result
of the defendant's failure to publish the advertisement. Their causal relation to the breach is purely
speculative."
A strikingly similar case to the one under consideration is United States v. Huff, 175 Fed. 2d, 678 where a
plaintiff claimed damages for lost sheep and goats because
the defendant had destroyed fences. In commenting on
the evidence the court said:
ult therefore becomes patent that the evidence
as to the loss of these animals in each case fails to
rise above mere speculation and guess.
uWhile it may be inviting to approve the trial
court's findings and allow at least a partial recovery
for such losses, it remains our solemn duty under
this evidence to disallow these unproved claims, as
it is well settled that speculative damages are not
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recoverable. It was incumbent upon these plaintiffs to adduce some clear and convincing proof of
specific losses resulting solely from the Government's failure to repair and maintain the fences
and this they have signally failed to do."
See also Addison-Miller, Inc. v. U. S., 70 Fed. Supp.
893; William H. Schwanke, Inc. v. Wis. Tel Co., (Wis.)
227 N.W. 30; Tribune Co. v. Bradshaw, (Ill.), 20 Ill. App.
17; Stevens v. Yale, (Mich.) 72 N.W. 5; Winston Cigarette Machine Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., (N.C)
53 SE 885; Murray v. Texas Co., (S.C.) 174 S.E. 231;
Harman v. Western Union Tel. Co., (S.C.) 43 S.E. 959.
As long as there are factors involved in this case which
just as effectively could have prevented these plaintiffs
from securing their financing in 1952, 1953 and 1954 as
the existence of defendant's recorded chattel mortgages
and unless there is evidence in the record which eliminates
those factors as a possible reason for the rejection of their
applications, there is no showing of proximate cause and
the judgment rendered by the court rests upon speculation and guess and cannot be permitted to stand. See also

Blakely Printing Co. v. Ft. Dearborn Mercantile Co.,
supra; Jenson v. S. H. Kress Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 Pac. 2d
958; Tremelling v. So. Pac. Co. 257 Pac. 1066 70 Utah 72;
Virend v. Utah Ore Sampling Co., 48 Utah 398, 160 Pac.
115 and Quinn v. Utah Gas f5 Coke Co., 42 Utah 113, 129
Pac. 362. Notwithstanding the utter lack of causation to
support plaintiffs' claim, the judgment complained of was
rendered by the trial court which, in the interest of
justice, now requires reversal.
POINT 9
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE
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REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACTED
IN GOOD FAITH.
Evidence supporting the above proposition is found
in the testimony of the witness, Williams, appearing on
pages 211, 212, 216, 277 and 270 of the transcript. There
is nothing in the record contradicting this testimony. This
being the only evidence on the question, the trial court
could not ignore it or make a finding contrary to it. Any
finding made by the court contrary to this testimony unsupported by evidence. impeaching its credibility is
against the evidence and hence is reversible error. On the
question of good faith as a defense for failure or refusal
to release a mortgage, this court has spoken in Shibata v.
Bear River State Bank, supra. In that case the plaintiff was
denied recovery because defendant in not releasing a mortgage was acting upon the advice of its attorney in good
faith. This court uses this language (eferring to Sec.
57-3-8:

((The above statute is penal in nature and
should be strictly construed. It is not meant
to penalize one who honestly, though mistakenly
refuses to discharge or release a mortgage of record
because he believes there has been no full satisfaction. Under the facts and circumstances of this
case where the bank, relying upon the advice of an
attorney, honestly thinks that it had valid and subsisting mortgages against appellant which had not
been sa tis:fied, refused to release the mortgages, it
was acting in good faith and was therefore not
liable for damages under the above section."
See also International Harvester Co. v. Simpson, supra.
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There is proof in the record from which it conclusively appears that the defendant was relying on the advice of its counsel. It must be presumed that defendant
acted in good faith when it was following a policy with
regard to releasing mortgages laid down by its counsel as
a business procedure to protect the best interests of the
defendant. The policy was, to retain all mortgages as
long as there was unpaid indebtedness owing to the company. It is submitted that the court could not ignore the
testimony of the witness Williams and refuse to give it
any credit whatsoever without some evidence in the record
which would indicate that the defendant was not acting
in good faith.
POINT 10
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS THAT SCOVILLE, EREKSON
AND SCHINKER PROMISED OR AGREED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE MORTGAGES
WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF AGENCY
OR AUTHORITY OF SAID PERSONS TO MAKE
SUCH PROMISES, AND FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY
ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PERSONS HAD NO
SUCH AUTHORITY.
The court permitted the plaintiffs to testify to
promises or agreements supposedly made by Scoville, Erekson and Schinker relating to release of the 1949 chattel
mortgage and to defendant's agreement to accept the real
estate mortgage of August 15, 1950 as payment of said
chattel mortgage and other alleged promises related to
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the release of the chattel mortgages of 1950 and 1951.
(Tr. 101-103, 105, 108, 149-53) The witness Erekson
denied that he made any promise on defendant's behalf.
On the contrary he specifically and categorically denied
that he had any authority to do so. (Tr. 256-58, 263)
There is nothing in the record showing that Scoville, a
salesman of the defendant, had such authority. The same
observation applies to Schinker. Mr. Williams specifically
testified that none of these individuals had such authority.
(Tr. 211-12, 215-17, 267, 270) The documentary evidence relating to releases (Ex. HE-5" and uE-6") written
by Schinker, do not contain any promissory language, but
on the contrary state that no mortgages could be released
until Mr. Williams, the general manager, gave his approval. Exhibits uy", ((C-6" uC-7" conclusively show
that the extent of Scoville's authority relating to one mortgage was to take it after it was prepared by Mr. Quinney
to H. William Nalder, Sr. and get it signed.
This court has many times passed upon the question
of the proof required to establish agency to bind a principal. In Witherow v. Mystic Toilers, 42 Utah 360, 130
Pac. 58, this court makes this statement:
uof course agency cannot be shown by declarations of the agent. And, before declarations of
the agent may be received as admissions against his
principal, the agency and the authority of the
agent must first be shown. Here neither was shown.
Nor is it true, as the court seems to indicate in the
charge, that declarations of an agent, to show
agency, go merely to the question of sufficiency of
the evidence to show such relation, and hence may
be considered for such purpose, in connection with
other evidence. The authorities, we think, are to
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the effect that such evidence is incompetent for
such purpose, and that the fact of agency must be
established by evidence dehors the declarations of
the agent.
In Jenson v. S. H. Kress Co., supra, plaintiff was permitted
to testify to a hearsay statement of a former employee of
the defendant without a showing that the statement made
was binding on the defendant because made in the course
of employment or under authority. It was held that the
statement testified to by plaintiff was hearsay and was not
binding upon the defendant. See Booth v. Nelson, 61
Utah 239, 211 Pac. 985, and 20 Am. fur. P. 508, Sec. 598,
and Cole v. Myers, (Conn.) 21 Atl. 2d 396.
It is submitted, therefore, that all of the evidence in
this case relating to the question of promises or agreements made to release the chattel mortgages or to accept
the real estate mortgage (Ex. HC-9") in satisfaction of the
1949 chattel mortgage were inadmissible, and should have
been stricken from the record when motion to strike the
same was made by the defendant.
POINT 11
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND IN NUMEROUS RULINGS ON OBJECTIONS TO LEADING
AND OTHER IMPROPER QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY COUNSEL.
During the course of the trial, Exhibit HP", which
had been prepared by the witness Boothe, a Ralston-Purina
salesman, was offered in evidence. (Tr. 70-73) As a
foundation for the exhibit Boothe testified that the information from which it had been compiled had been furn-
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ished by plaintiff N alder who had obtained it from the
books of the Lee Brown Company and Rasmussen Grain
Company. The admission of this exhibit was objected to
by defendant upon the ground that it was hearsay. It is
submitted that the objection was well taken and should
have been sustained. The exhibit was damaging to the
defendant because it purported to show plaintiffs as competent turkey raisers.
Throughout the trial, counsel asked leading and suggestive questions in direct examination of the plaintiffs.
Repeated objections were made to such questions which
were denied by the court. It is submitted that all such
objections should have been sustained. The trial court apparently proceeded upon the assumption that since no
jury was involved in the trial of the case it was immaterial
what form the questions of counsel might take. Nevertheless, all such questions were highly improper and their
repeated asking should have been ordered discontinued.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case establishes that plaintiffs are
indebted to defendant for the amount demanded in defendant's answer and counterclaim. On the other hand,
the record clearly demonstrates that defendant was fully
entitled to retain all mortgages of record, and that it did
so acting in good faith and upon advice of counsel. There
is a complete failure of proof that the existence of defendant's mortgages upon the records was the cause of plaintiffs' alleged losses and the judgment in plaintiffs' favor is
founded upon incompetent evidence of damage. Furthermore, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, Catherine Nalder, to which she was clearly not entitled, and like-
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wise, judgment was granted in favor of H. William Nalder, Jr. for failure to release real estate mortgages not
signed or executed by him and he was awarded punitive
damages under a statute which he had no right to evoke.
For all of the reasons referred to in this brief the judgment should be reversed with directions to enter judgment
for defendant for the amount due upon its mortgage and
to enter a decree of foreclosure and order of sale and dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
ALBERT R. BOWEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellants
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